Vietnam

In Vietnam, Gary R. Hess describes and evaluates the main arguments of scholars, participants, and journalists, both revisionist and orthodox in their approach, as they try to answer fundamental questions of the Vietnam War. Clearly examines the historiography of the Vietnam War Questions whether the Vietnam War was lost due to poor strategy and leadership, or was inherently doomed to failure Includes a bibliographic essay which complements the literature discussed in the text

Preface ix 1 From the Streets to the Books: The Origins of an Enduring Debate 1 2 A Necessary War or a Mistaken War? 25 3 “Kennedy Exceptionalism” or “Missed Opportunity for Peace” or “Lost Victory?” – The Movement toward War, 1961-1965 50 4 The Revisionist Critique of the “Other War” – The Clausewitzian Alternative 84 5 The Revisionist Critique of the “Strategy for Defeat” – The Clausewitzian Alternative 84 6 The Media and the War: Shaping or Reflecting Public Opinion? 133 7 The Tet Offensive: A decisive American Victory or a Prolongation of Stalemate? 154 8 Nixon-Kissinger and the Ending of the War; A “Lost Victory” or “Neither Peace nor Honor?” 179 9 Conclusion 207 Bibliography 211 Index 214