簡介
This book presents and analyzes the most important arguments in the history of Western philosophy's skeptical tradition. It demonstrates that, although powerful, these arguments are quite limited and fail to prove their core assertion that knowledge is beyond our reach.
Argues that skepticism is mistaken and that knowledge is possible
Dissects the problems of realism and the philosophical doubts about the accuracy of the senses
Explores the ancient argument against a criterion of knowledge, Descartes' skeptical arguments, and skeptical arguments applied to inductive inference and self-knowledge
Uses Moore's proof of an external world and the reliabilist conception of knowledge to illustrate that the traditional skeptical arguments fail to meet their mark.
目錄
Preface. 1. Skepticism and the Retreat from Realism.
2. The Great Deception of Sense.
3. Justification, Truth, and Realism.
4. Global Skepticism, Pyrrhonism, and the Criterion Argument.
5. The Argument Against the Criterion.
6. Two Pyrrhonian Problems.
7. Descartes' Dream Argument.
8. Skepticism and Common Sense.
9. Moore's Proof of an External World.
10. Defending Moore's Proof.
11. The Problem of the Shaky Inference.
12. Inference and Interpretation.
13. Hume's Riddle of Induction.
14. Descartes' Cogito and the Problem of Self Knowledge.
15. The Problem of Knowledge.
Bibliography.
Index.
