Economic Inputs, Legal Outputs

Brings together a selection of articles which discuss the role of economists in the enforcement of antitrust law. Presents the various ways economists function in the world of antitrust. Includes econometric market delineation, monopolies, and antitrust analysis. Features dozens of antitrust legal proceedings as well as analyses of industrial organizations.

Introduction: The Demand for and Supply of Economics in Modern Antitrust (F. McChesney). The Causes and Consequences of the Aluminum MOU (R. Higgins, et al.). Identifying Contracts, Combinations and Conspiracies in Restraint of Trade (A. Dick). Distinguishing Participants from Nonparticipants in a Price-fixing Conspiracy: Liability and Damages (R. Blair & R. Romano). Durable Goods, Maintenance, and Tying Arrangements (W. Shughart). Market Power in Aftermarkets (B. Klein). The Role of Economics in Defining Antitrust Injury and Standing (R. Blair & W. Page). Breakfast at the Federal Trade Commission (W. Shughart, et al.). Econometric Market Delineation (D. Scheffman & P. Spiller). The Nuts and Bolts of Antitrust Analysis: Some Thoughts on How to Develop the Facts (D. Kaplan). Market Share and Market Power in Merger and Monopolization Cases (D. Cameron & M. Glick). Measuring Market Power When the Firm has Power in the Input and Output Markets (K. Hylton & M. Lasser). The Demsetz Postulate and the Welfare Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries (L. Froeb, et al.). Monopoly and the Problem of the Economists (W. Shughart).