簡介
This volume puts forward a distinct new theory of direct reference, blending insights from both the Fregean and the Russellian traditions, and fitting the general theory of language understanding used by those working on the pragmatics of natural language
目錄
Preface. Part I: Direct Reference in Language and Thought.
I.1 De re Communication.
1. Direct Reference and Linguistic Meaning: Rigidity de jure. .
2. Singular Propositions and Thoughts.
3. The Communication of de re Thoughts.
I.2 From Language to Thought.
4. Linguistic and Psychological Modes of Presentation.
5. The Meaning and Cognitive Significance of Indexical Expressions.
I.3 De re Thoughts.
6. De re Modes of Presentation.
7. Egocentric Concepts vs. Encyclopedia Entries.
I.4 Proper Names.
8. The Meaning of Proper Names.
9. Answering Kripke's Objections.
10. Proper Names in Thought.
I.5 The Two-Component Picture: A Defence.
11. Narrow Content and Psychological Explanation.
12. Externalism and the Two-Component Picture.
Part II: The Pragmatics of Direct Reference.
II.1 Methodological Preliminaries.
13. Truth-Conditional Pragmatics.
14. Primary Pragmatic Processes.
II.2 Referential/Attributive.
15. The Referential Use of Definite Descriptions.
16. The Descriptive Use of Indexicals.
II.3 Belief Reports.
17. Belief Reports and Conversational Implicatures.
18. Belief Reports and the Semantics of That-Clauses.
19. Comparison with Other Accounts.
20. How Ambiguous are Belief Sentences?.
Bibliography.
Index.
